Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

STATE OF UTAH, Appellee/Plaintiff, vs. TIMOTHY F. OSEN,
Appellant/Defendant. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Daniel S. Sam; attorney for appellants.
Mark Thomas; attorney for appellees.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Osen, No. 20160983 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/4091

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons.
Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/
policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee/Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 20160983-CA

TIMOTHY F. OSEN,

Appellant/Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from a Final Order
in the Eighth District Court, Uintah County
Honorable Lyle Anderson presiding

Attorney for Appellees:
(jb

Mark Thomas
. 641 East 300 South, Suite 200
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 781-5436

Attorney for Appellants:
SAM, REYNOLDS &
VAN O0STEND0RP,

P.C .

Daniel S. Sam, #5865
23 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 789-1301

FILED

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

OEC ·· 6 2017
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 20160983-CA

TIMOTHY F. OSEN,
Appellant/Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
Appeal from a Final Order
in the Eighth District Court, Uintah County
Honorable Lyle Anderson presiding

Attorney for Appellees:

Attorney for Appellants:

Mark Thomas
641 East 300 South, Suite 200
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 781-5436

SAM, REYNOLDS &

P.C.
Daniel S. Sam, #5865
23 East Main Street
Vernal, Utah 84078
(435) 789-1301
VAN O0STEND0RP,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................... ii
ARGUMENT ........................................................... I

I.

THE LOWER COURT DID ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROTECTIVE
ORDER WAS INTENDED TO LAST INDEFINITELY BECAUSE THIS
POSITION rs CONTRARY TO STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND BECAUSE
THE LANGUAGE IN THE PROTECTIVE ORDER CAN CLEARLY BE
CONSTRUED OTHERWISE .......................................... I

II.

WHEN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO DISMISS THE APPELLANT'S
PROTECTIVE ORDER, THE LOWER COURT SHOULD USE THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR DISMISSAL CONTAINED IN UTAH CODE ANN.§
77-36-5.1 UNLESS DECIDED OTHERWISE AND IN THAT CASE THE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-7-155 SHOULD BE
USED ............................................................ 4

III.

APPELLANT DID OBJECT TO THE LACK OF A HEARING TO REVIEW
THE DISMISSAL OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDERS UNDER RELEVANT
STA TUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND AT NO TIME DID THE APPELLANT
WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING .................. 6

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 7
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................... 8
~

-1-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASE LAW
United States v. Burke, 633 F.3d 984, 994 (10th Cir. 2011) ........................ 3
STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §77-36-5.1(6) .......................................... 3, 4, 5
Utah Code Ann. §78B-7-115 ......................................... 3, 4, 5, 6

-11-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE LOWER COURT DID ERR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
PROTECTIVE ORDER WAS INTENDED TO LAST INDEFINITELY
BECAUSE THIS POSITION IS CONTRARY TO STATUTORY

PROVISIONS AND BECAUSE THE LANGUAGE IN THE PROTECTIVE
ORDER CAN CLEARLY BE CONSTRUED OTHERWISE.

The lower court ruled the protective order was in effect to last for the life time of
~

the Appellant. By this reasoning, the lower court avoided using its discretion pursuant to
statute to decide the matter of whether the protective orders against the Appellant should
be dismissed. The lower court may have made statements about the court's ability to
exercise its discretion in modifying orders, but these statements were vague at best. Taken
as a whole, the written order attached as App. Addendum C, in essence, says that because
the protective orders are permanent the lower court would not exercise its discretion to
decide whether or not the protective orders should be dismissed. The lower court erred
when it did not apply the statutory standards for deciding whether the protective orders
should be dismissed after being in effect for 18 years without any meaningful breaches.
Though the lower court did state that it has discretion to modify orders, it did not
apply the standards under the statute to review Appellant's matter. The court instead
reasoned that it should not disrupt the agreement struck in the plea bargain unless the
Appellant could show the existence of extraordinary circumstances. The lower court
determined the protective order was created as a result of a plea bargain and because the
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protective order contained language stating that the protective order was permanent and
that it would not expire. The lower court interpreted this language in the protective order
to mean the parties intend the protective order to last for Defendant's lifetime.
Additionally, the lower court said that because of the presence of a plea bargain
agreement, it felt uncomfortable making the decision to consider dismissing the protective
order. In regard to considering dismissing the protective order and because of the
language of what the court considered to be language of permanency in the protective
order, the lower court stated, "And if that's the case I don't want to be the one to tell them
that. I think it should be a higher court than me that says wait a second, I don't think you
can do that," (App. Addendum A at 30.) This reasoning of the lower court was in error.
The protective order should not have been interpreted as a never ending protective
order. The consequences of such an interpretation are oppressively burdensome. They
would require the Appellant to go without rights, constitutional and otherwise, for his
entire life. In light of such consequences, one would think that the language of the
protective order would be much more specific, for example, "This protective order shall
last for the life of the Appellant and never be dismissed." It is true that constructed
against the Appellant, one could interpret the language of "permanent protective order"
and "shall not expire" to mean until the end of the life of the Appellant. However, this
reasoning is unreasonable and the meaning should be constructed in favor of the
Appellant. Construed in favor of the Appellant, the language in the protective order

2
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means that the protective order will be a permanent one that shall not automatically expire
after a specific time and will only be dismissed after appropriate review by the court. In
fact this is how this language is defined in guardianships, where a temporary order may be
made permanent. Yet the permanent order is always subject to review upon showing of
substantial change in circumstances. However, the court decided this reasoning would
destroy the agreement between the parties to the plea bargain. But, this is hardly the case.
Surely by this point in time the bargain has been fulfilled. Appellant has abided by the
terms of the protective order for 18 years without a single conviction for violation and the
protective order is and has been a permanent protective order that has not expired nor will
ever expire until the court dismisses it. Pursuant to the ruling in United States v. Burke,
663 F .3d 984, 994, ambiguous statements should be interpreted against the government
and in favor of the defendant. The lower court erred by constructing the ambiguous
language against the Appellant.
The lower court erred when it did not apply its discretion in deciding to dismiss the
protective order after reviewing the matter under relevant statutory provisions. Utah Code
~

Ann.§ 78B-7-155 and§ 77-36-5.1 provide the relevant analysis the lower court should
have considered when deciding whether to dismiss Appellant's protective order. These
statues allow the court to dismiss permanent protective orders if the requisites under the
statute are met. The lower court did not allow the Appellant to proceed in showing
Appellant had met these statutory requirements. The Appellant should be allowed to
present his evidence that the statutory requirements have been met after these 18 years.
3
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Therefore, the court should reverse the decision of the lower court and remand this case
for consideration as to whether the statutory requirements of the Utah Code have been
satisfied so as to allow the court to dismiss the protective orders against the defendant.

II.

WHEN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO DISMISS THE

APPELLANT'S PROTECTIVE ORDER, THE LOWER COURT SHOULD
USE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR DISMISSAL CONTAINED IN UT AH
CODE ANN.§ 77-36-5.1 UNLESS DECIDED OTHERWISE AND IN THAT
CASE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-7-155
SHOULD BE USED.

Pursuant to Appellee's argument that Appellant did not acknowledge the
difference between civil and criminal protective orders, the Appellant clarifies that he
acknowledges the protective orders at issue are criminal protective orders as stated in the
protective orders themselves. Prior to May 9, 2017, there was no statute that was
specifically on point and provided requirements for dismissing permanent criminal
protective orders. Today, this is not the case. On May 9, 2017, the amended Utah Code
Ann. § 77-36-5. I took effect which lays out the requirements for a court to dismiss a
permanent criminal protective order. Prior to this statute, the only requirements provided
for dismissing pennanent protective orders were for civil protective orders under Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-7-155. The legislature clearly saw a gap that needed to be filled and
amended § 77-36-5.1 to fill that gap. Now, the requirements for dismissing a permanent
criminal protective order are essentially the same as the requirements for dismissing a
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civil protective order. In effect, these requirements are to show the Appellant has not
violated the protective orders and that the victim does not have a reasonable fear of future
harm or abuse. The lower court should be ordered to review the matter of dismissing
Appellant's protective orders under Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-5. l and allow the Appellant
to present evidence proving the requirements under this statute have been met.
In the event that Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-5.1 should not apply in this matter, then
the requirements for dismissal of a protective order under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-155
should apply. The Appellant acknowledges this statute applies to civil protective orders,
but in light of the absence of requirements for dismissal of permanent criminal protective
orders at the time of the hearing, Appellant argues the requirements for dismissal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-155 should apply. These requirements are essentially the same
as were adopted for the dismissal of permanent criminal protective orders under the
amended Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-5.1, being that the Appellant must show he has not
violated the protective order and the victim no longer has reasonable fear of abuse or
harm. If Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-5.1 is determined to not apply to this matter, then Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-7-155 should apply because at the time of the hearing, requirements for
dismissal of permanent protective orders were not yet codified and the requirements
under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-155 were relevant to deciding whether or not to dismiss
Appellant's protective orders.
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III.

APPELLANT DID OBJECT TO THE LACK OF A HEARING TO REVIEW
THE DISMISSAL OF THE PROTECTIVE ORDERS UNDER RELEVANT
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND AT NO TIME DID THE
APPELLANT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

It is not true that Appellant did not object to the lack of a hearing to review the
dismissal of the protective orders. At the October 27, 2016 hearing, the Appellant's
Attorney argued that the statutory requirements for dismissal of protective orders of Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-7-155 should apply. Part of this argument was that the Appellant should
have had an opportunity to prove Appellant met the requirements for dismissal of his
protective orders under the statute. However, the court denied the Appellant this
opportunity and decided it would not apply the requirements for dismissal under Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-7-155. Instead, the lower court ruled that it would not dismiss the
protective orders because it would disrupt the plea bargain agreement. Appellant objected
to the lack of an opportunity to present evidence showing that Appellant met the statutory
requirements for dismissal by arguing first that these statutory requirements should apply.
After the lower court ruled against Appellant and rejected the Appellant's reasoning,
objecting to the lower court's ruling would have been fruitless. It should not be construed
that Appellant failed to object to an evidentiary hearing and thereby waived his rights to
such a hearing.
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CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully asserts that this
matter should be remanded.
Dated this

_h_ day of December, 2017.
SAM, REYNOLDS & VAN O0STEND0RP, P.C.

11()~!VL-.
Daniel S. Sam
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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